Friday 12 August 2011

Corruption in security: Excuses, excuses

One of the main roles of a state is to provide security.  States do that in many ways and through many institutions: the military, the police, border controls etc. All of these institutions are, just like any part of the public administration, at risk of corruption. But there are also some problems that are specific to security and make corruption in this area difficult to uncover or to fix.

First, there is a lot of secrecy around the provision of security.  This means that there is less chance of getting caught if you do something corrupt.  Hence, we might expect there to be more corruption (at least, that would be the thinking according to Klitgaard's model of corruption as occurring when officials have monopoly power, discretion, and a lack of accountability; as well as Becker's model of individuals as likely to break the law when the chance of being caught is small and the penalties low).

Second, it's often possible to claim that a decision has been made in the national interest, even if it looks like it was corrupt.  Somehow the national interest is a trump card beyond which people stop questioning.

Third, when corruption is uncovered in the security sphere, the institutions usually clam up and prevent investigations, or conduct inquiries but don't publish the results.  This exacerbates the sense that the institution is corrupt and makes it difficult to rebuild trust.

Fourth, whereas the first step towards fighting corruption in most parts of the public administration is to increase transparency and accountability, in security provision, the same secrecy and national interest reflexes often emerge to block such reforms.  You can see this, for example, in defence procurement, where open and competitive tenders are still much rarer than they should be - see Pyman et al cited below.

But trust is arguably more important for security institutions than for many other parts of the public administration.  If you don't trust the military, you won't sign up to fight.  If you don't trust the police, their job becomes much harder.  If the guy on the border takes bribes, it's all too easy for a terrorist to get a bomb onto a plane.

We need to think about how accountability can be achieved for security institutions.  Here are some papers that I have come across which consider some of these questions:

Moran, Jon. 2005. 'Blue walls,' 'grey areas' and 'cleanups': Issues in the control of police corruption in England and Wales. Crime, Law and Social Change, 43(1): 57-79. 

Pyman, Mark, Regina Wilson and Dominic Scott. 2009. ‘The Extent of Single Sourcing in Defence Procurement and its Relevance as a Corruption Risk: A First Look’, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3: 215-232.
  
Teets, Jessica C. and Erica Chenoweth. 2009.  ‘To Bribe or to Bomb: Do Corruption and Terrorism Go Together?’ in Rotberg, Robert I (ed.).  Corruption, Global Security and World Order. Brookings Institution Press. 


TI-UK also has a great typology of defence corruption risks.

Thursday 11 August 2011

Today's Corruption News: 11 August 2011

There's an interesting piece in the Sydney Morning Herald about police corruption.  One of the astonishing things is the consistent lack of transparency. Inquiries get commissioned periodically, but their findings are never published.

My first thought is that that's not the way to rebuild trust.  But it also makes you wonder just how bad things are.

Wednesday 10 August 2011

Today's Links: 10 August 2011


Revolving Doors: Repairs in sight?

A journalist called me today to ask if the government was responding to any of the recommendations made in my recent report for Transparency International UK on the Revolving Door.  I was in the middle of something else and told him a little grumpily that I wasn't aware of any steps being taken but maybe he should call the Cabinet Office and ask them.

He didn't let me off that lightly, and I'm glad he didn't, because he got me thinking about the political feasibility of some of our proposals.  I can see, for example, that it's difficult to turn ACOBA into a statutory body when you are trying to cut spending on public administration.  And it's also not going to be popular with civil servants worried about their job security if you start putting new restrictions on their post-public employment.  I think both proposals are merited, but they do have downsides.

But I fail to see a downside with some of our other suggestions.  For instance, why not make the ACOBA committee more representative of society?  It does look bad that it comprises, as Radio 4 producer Andy Denwood pointed out, four peers, two knights and a dame.  What is to be lost by appointing a couple of representatives of civil society to give a different perspective?

I also think our suggestion to do a risk assessment of different types of role is a no-brainer.  An individual who has worked in procurement  in the Ministry of Defence should be treated as higher risk than a press officer in the Ministry of Justice.  Just as companies do risk assessments when they are considering going into business with a new partner, and then do deeper or shallower due diligence depending on the level of risk, ACOBA should have a sophisticated system for assessing where the greatest risks of a conflict of interest lie.


Tuesday 9 August 2011

Today's Links: 9 August 2011

ENRC calls in outsiders to examine corruption claims 
Ex-Bangladesh PM named in graft case
China: Bribery websites up and running

India's Anti-Corruption Bill: A New Definition of Untouchable?

India's new draft anti-corruption law suffers from one of the main problems outlined in my previous blog on anti-corruption agencies: the ombudsman, or lokpal, that it establishes to investigate corruption would lack the power to investigate the prime minister, MPs, and many senior public officials.  The lokpal does have considerable powers vis a vis other offices, which are nicely set out by the Wall Street Journal here.

But nonetheless it means that, right from the start, the all-important Tone at the Top is lacking.  That  sends a very unhelpful message that guys at the top are untouchable and means that other agencies are going to be cautious about cooperating.

Is an ineffective anti-corruption agency better than none at all?  I'm not sure that it is.  In many places it's just a recipe for a highly politicised pursuit of one political tribe by another, undermining the trust in state institutions that is so necessary to building a better system.

Tuesday 2 August 2011

Revolving Doors Part 2

The risks of the Revolving Door are greatest in sectors where the government is a key buyer (as with defence or infrastructure) or the main regulator, as with financial services.

If the state is the main buyer, then the revolving door threatens to disrupt the market, meaning that the taxpayer does not get a good deal.

If the state is the main regulator, the revolving door brings a risk of regulatory capture, where the regulators are too close to the interests of the industry they are regulating to be able to serve the public interest properly.  That's why this list of 29 individuals who have moved from Wall Street to Washington to Wall Street is cause for concern.